I recently was forced to read Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The experience of reading Kant is one characterized by pure pain. To wash this bitter taste out of my mouth, I decided to reread Margaret Olivia Little’s Seeing and Caring. Little starts her essay out by discussing the history of a certain view – the view that sees emotions as being separate and subordinate to dispassionate reasoning. Little draws a clear connection to misogyny: philosophers viewed women as more emotional and less rational, and the normative view that places rationality above emotionality is a reflection of the view that places men above women.

Along similar lines as Little, I would like to further explore and criticize the general narrative that emotions are at odds with and subordinate to dispassionate reason, but my focus in this short blog is exclusively on the false dichotomy between reason and passionate emotions that Little addresses, rather than the argument for care ethics that she puts forward in her essay. This dichotomy (or at least the more explicit and extreme versions of it) has seemingly become less popular in contemporary philosophy, however, it is still very ingrained in public consciousness, where individuals are lauded as “rational” when they are calm, and “irrational” (or sometimes “triggered”) when they are angry, distraught, or otherwise emotional. What is the problem with this narrative, and what roles might it serve?

Problems with the reason vs. emotion dichotomy

There are several problems with the idea that emotions are at odds with reason. The first is that it overestimates the power and reliability of reason. In classical philosophy there is often a presumption of an almost magical reasoning ability that we can tap into to discover truth. Some classical philosophers write as though they have no idea what truth they will end up discovering, and are just observing their own impartial reason to see where it takes them – then, by some miracle, pure reason ends up confirming their pre-existing views. Descartes starts out in The Meditations by “doubting everything,” and ends up by reaffirming many of his prior views on things like the existence and nature of God. I am not of the belief that people are incapable of being reasonable, or that reason does not exist; but, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that we can tap into an unbiased, pure form of reasoning. Anyone who thinks they are doing so is using a particularly flawed and dangerous form of reasoning – one that is unaware of its own limitations.

The second problem is that the standard is not applied consistently. When someone like Jordan Peterson cries about the meaning of Disney’s Pinocchio (look this up, if you dare), it is lauded by his fans as brave, inspiring, powerful, and so on. Many of the same people, I would wager, would mock someone like Rashida Tlaib for crying publicly. This example is hypothetical, but there is also research to confirm the existence of race and sex-based double-standards in regards to emotionality. One study, for instance, shows that participants were more likely to attribute anger to the person, rather than the situation, when the person expressing anger is a black woman.

The third problem is that it frames displays of anger and sadness as irrational, even when they are the result of an injustice.  And, as we have seen, this is often attributed unequally. So, if a powerful person loses their cool, many will say “he was just provoked by the situation.” If a less-powerful person loses their cool, they will likely be dismissed as irrational or crazy.

What does this narrative do?

The dichotomy between reason and emotion is something that has become a kind of background assumption. It is possible that one of the roles that this cliche serves is to gaslight people with legitimate grievances and thereby preserve the status quo. Someone who is rightfully angry about an injustice may be dismissed because they are acting “overly emotional,” leading them to become more enraged and be taken even less seriously. Similarly, people who can articulate themselves in a dispassionate kind of way can easily be labeled as “reasonable” or “logical,” even when they are putting forward ideas which are wholly unreasonable. This isn’t to say that people knowingly and purposefully use this narrative (that reason is at odds with passionate emotions) to gaslight others and defend the status quo, but that perhaps this narrative  may have survived in part because it serves this purpose.

Who can afford to be “rational”?

Importantly, it is also easier to be “rational” when you do not have stake in the game. For instance, it is easier to have impartial, “rational” debates about whether or not a male can identify as a woman if you yourself are not experience life as a trans person. If you yourself are not a member of the group in question, you have the advantage of being able to discuss in a more impartial manner, but this is ability to discuss – let’s say, abortion – impartially, without feeling like your rights are at stake, is not necessarily a laudable thing. It is a kind of privilege that we should be aware and even cautious of.  Perhaps there is something wrong with the fact that I am able to open-mindedly consider both sides of an issue, when one side would not be viable (or at least less so) from certain  standpoints. For instance, a straight person may be able to have a “rational” discussion looking at both sides of something like the morality of gay marriage (perhaps this example is a bit outdated), but this stance would not be a viable option from a gay person’s perspective, since one side seeks to take away your rights. If one side would be impossible to hold from the standpoint of another class or identity-group, because it poses a direct threat, perhaps less cordial respect should be offered to that side of the debate. Admittedly, there is no easy way to figure out precisely what issues are worth treating cordially, and what are beyond the pale, but I believe this principle is at least worth considering. In regards to certain issues, the ability to calmly and impartially consider both sides of a debate is not available, nor even particularly rational, from certain standpoints, because one of the sides seeks to take away your rights or invalidate your existence. For issues like this, perhaps we should not offer cordial respect to both sides of the debate, just as we would not offer it to a debate over the moral wrongness of slavery, or whether women should have the right to vote.*

*just to clarify, this argument is not about free speech, because it is about what perspectives are worthy of respect, not what perspectives should be allowed to be spoken.